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This study seeks to examine a middle sized decision 
from initial impetus through implementation. Its 
central topic is not the automated bakery as such but 
the goals, processes and problems of decision taking 
in Tanzania as illustrated by the bakery case. In 
particular the effectiveness (or otherwise) of the 
more technical aspects of the planning process in 
transforming socio-political decisions into projects 
and operations achieving (or otherwise) the initial 
goals is subjected to scrutiny and ways of improving 
its performance suggested.
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Decision Taking: Case Study and Setting
This paper is not primarily about baking technology options 
nor choices among them. It is a case study of the decision 
taking process in Tanzania based on a single middle sized 
project - the Dar es Salaam automated bakery.
In fact the study does not pay equal attention to all parts 
of the planning and decision taking process. The overtly 
political stages: the mass demand for ending what was
perceived as exploitation of consumers by bakers, the 
decision by the then Minister of Agriculture (a Dar es Salaam 
Member of the National Assembly) that he must give priority 
attention to meeting this demand and the process by which 
other Dar es Salaam TANU leaders and Cabinet colleagues 
were convinced of the need to act are not examined in detail. 
Equally the political economic and socio political framework 
(of ideology or politics in command so far as basic decisions 
and lines of action are concerned) of Tanzania over 1968-72 
are taken as given and articulated as they relate to the 
bakery and to the technical planning process. They are not 
analyzed in terms of their own ideological content nor are 
the causes of their evolution or the institutional and class 
participation in their formulation examined.
*The author wishes to thank Raphie Kaplinsky of IDS and IDS 
(Nairobi) for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper.
2The technical part of the decision taking process - on which 
this study centers - was within these parameters. It did 
involve genuinely technical and analytical exercises which 
required specialists. It resulted in proposals for articulation 
and implementation of the overtly political decisions which 
went back to involved Ministers and - at least for information - 
to the Dar es Salaam TANU leaders and to the constituents 
who had first raised the issue.
The primary focus of this paper is on how the technical - 
and to a lesser degree the overtly political - aspect of the 
decision taking process operated and how well ~ in retrospect - 
it fulfilled the' political goals informing the parameters 
within which it operated. The main purpose is to consider 
what light can be thrown on the limitations and strengths 
of the process and on how the former could be reduced ana 
the latter preserved. Refutation - or at least placing in 
context - of selective criticism of the Automatic Bakery 
itself is very much a secondary focus in this study although 
it was nearer the center of an earlier version.
The question of participation does not fit very neatly within 
the study because of the portion of the decision taking 
process analyzed in detail.
1. the Initial demand to act on bread was an urban household 
mass demand;
2. therefore the decision to act was the result of mass 
participation;
3. equally the parameters within which the public sector 
personnel (planning, management and engineering technicians) 
worked had been framed by a mass party and to a very 
significant degree in response to worker and peasant 
demands (which from time to time led to their modification 
or evolution as in the 1967 Arusha Declaration and 1971 
Mwongozo);
4. the proposals of the technical personnel were subject 
to Ministerial approval and - had there been serious 
political reservations or popular criticism - to review 
by the Central or National Executive Committees of the
1. The use of the words "technical part" does not imply a 
belief that technical and political can be rigidly separated 
or that proposals on - e.g. - machinery do not have political 
consequences. Indeed the stress is on the interaction of 
technical issues and choices and political parameters. However, 
it is equally necessary to avoid seeing the whole process as 
100% political with no technical content and officials as 
being political decision takers basically indistinguishable 
from Ministers or Party Leaders.
Party (bodies politically senior to the Cabinet, albeit 
not as of 1968-72 involving themselves in detailed 
policy or decision supervision unless they had cause 
to believe the decisions thwarted rather than implemented 
Party policy);
5. the decisions - after Cabinet and before National 
Assembly approval - were widely publicized and could 
have been challenged (as the abuses they were meant 
to correct had been);
6. however, there was no detailed discussion with
Dar es Salaam TANU officials or constituents either as 
to how they thought the goal of pure bread of correct 
weight might be achieved nor of what they thought 
about the articulated proposals as they emerged from 
the technical personnel's hands;
7. Further, while a wide range of public sector officials 
and institutions were involved in the articulation of 
proposals to implement the decisions these certainly 
did not include 'men in the street' or 'shop floor 
workers' .
The first five points demonstrate that to view the Automatic 
Bakery decision process as a whole as non-participatory or 
the product of a closed bureaucratic elite of planning 
technicians is quite inaccurate. Whatever else may be said 
of them, Tanzanian public sector officials operate within 
guidelines set for them by the political process and have 
quite limited degrees of freedom so far as these are concerned; 
a reality of which they are aware (indeed often aware to the 
point of exaggeration leading to failure to take initiatives 
open to them and, indeed, intended by the political decision 
takers).
However, the sixth point demonstrates a not uncommon weakness 
in participation in Tanzania. Discussion of problems and goals 
is regularly followed by equallyopen detailed discussion of 
means only if local or communal rather than national (govern­
mental or public enterprise) action is envisaged. The weakness 
is a mass as well as a leader one - there is no reason to 
suppose that most of those demanding action on bread had 
clear views on or wished to think about what to do in detail. 
They as well as their MP were likely to perceive that as the 
leaders'and the technical personnel's duty.
The same considerations apply with respect to pre-adoption 
discussion of the articulated proposals. In this case 
there is little reason to suppose such discussion would have 
led to a referral back to study new options. However, in 
other cases - e.g. the 1973-74 plans for household moves to 
development villages - such participation would certainly 
have given early warning that technical articulation was net 
on the road to implementing initial mass based political
4decisions (Villagization had been Party Conqress decision 
viewed with no enthusiasm by most officials) but to directing 
them in ways unwelcome to many workers and peasants.
The seventh point raises rather more vexed problems. There 
are areas in which technical expertise (whether in finance 
or backing, physical planning or hard technology, public 
sector organisation and management or agronomy) are needed.
In some of these cases the man on the shop floor (at the 
oven door?) or in the field is an expert on some key aspects. 
E.g. in the development village technical articulation 
peasants (and their 10 House Party Cell leaders) could, 
had they been drawn into this phase of the planning process, 
have helped improve technical decisions. Whether this is 
true in the case of bakeries is unclear - that the question 
was not seriously asked is a valid criticism given the nature 
of Tanzania's ideological commitment to participation as 
set out in Mwongozo.
II
Introduction to a Debate
The Automated Bakery project in Dar es Salaam has been a 
focal point for debate in Tanzania. The choice is rather 
surprising. With a Sh 18 million odd final cost, the project 
is not a central one nor is it the largest National Milling 
Corporation new investment over 1967-75. The bakery is 
producing bread without major negative effects on other 
bakers, on NMC financial viability or on bread prices. The 
debate has also been somewhat peculiar in that the bakery 
has had no enthusiastic 'first best' defenders; a situation 
this analysis will not alter although it may go some way 
toward explaining it.
In fact the Automatic Bakery debate is in large measure about 
other issues of which the bakery is claimed to be an example. 
These range from the assertion2 that a concern for investible 
surplus generation by parastatals demonstrates their basically 
capitalist nature, through the argument that 'advanced' 
techniques plus large plants are inherently centralist especially 
when small scale simple technique options exist, to micro 
criticisms of machinery, building and design costs. These are - 
or are claimed by the critics to be - major strategic and 
policy errors examplified by the bakery.
2.The proposition is in general faulty. Both in the transition 
to socialism and socialism, investible surplus must be gen­
erated and invested. It is in communism (in the technical 
sense not the polemic) that surplus generation fades out as a 
central requirement in the marxist s tern.
5The most comprehensive critical analysis is "The Automated 
Bread Factory", by Andrew C. Coulson formerly of the University 
of Dar es Salaam and associated with the Ministry of 
Agriculture's planning and analysis at the time of the bakery 
decisions. It presents most of the lines of criticism and 
a good deal of factual information. However, its factual 
data are highly selective especially when it comes to stating 
the 1968-72 institutional positions and reasoning. As a 
result, while stimulating, the paper builds an edifice on 
the implied (or asserted) foundation that NMC (particularly 
its General Manager) initiated the project to achieve greater 
NMC control over flour use and higher NMC investible surpluses 
and that project supporters were primarily concerned with 
surpluses. This is unfortunately a foundation built of 
sand - NMC (and particularly its General Manager) did not 
initiate and were highly sceptical of the project and the 
backers were arguing from social welfare not surplus premises.
The result of this is that Coulson's critique miscarries 
(for reasons surprising in an actor in the process who 
should have known what positions were held and why). This 
would not be serious if the bakery project - whatever its 
micro merits under the constraints and possibilities of 
1968-72 - did not illustrate a number of strategic, analytical, 
decision taking and implementation problems. Therefore, a 
re-examination of the project and of the criticisms of and 
alternatives to it may be useful.3
III.
Genesis and Course of a Decision
The initiatives leading to the automatic bakery decision flowed 
from the Ministry (and in particular the Minister) of Agriculture 
in 1968. Derek Bryceson quite explicitly began from the 
fact that a number of his constituents had complained of 
adulteration (with sawdust, rice hulls and condemned grain) 
and of shortweighting of bread. His own investigation of 
these complaints led him to conclude that the practices were 
widespread and constituted a serious form of exploitation of
3. The potential value of such an analysis does not lie in 
assigning blame or credit let alone in defending (or retro­
spectively revising) past positions. Indeed only secondarily 
does it relate to the Automatic Bakery decision as such. Rather, 
the primary potential contribution lies in identifying the 
type of substantive and procedural problems which have confronted 
the decision preparing and taking process in Tanzania and the 
ways by which they have been resolved, partially capitulated 
to or evaded. That identification can perhaps be of use to 
those responsible for strengthening the process for future 
decisions both in Tanzania and in similarly situated polities.
6poor workers by private sector bakeries. The minister s 
response to what he (and others including several who doubted 
the wisdom of the automatic bakery) perceived as a real and 
pressing problem was to propose five or six automated bakeries 
for Dar es Salaam and other major towns. As the national 
public enterprise responsible for grain milling, and in the 
absence of effective district and regional public enterprise 
alternativesp NMC was seen from the outset as the appropriate 
vehicle for implementing the proposals.
The General Manager of the National Milling Corporation and 
his senior personnel did not deny the existence of adulter­
ation and shortweighing. They did indicate that in their 
opinion a large scale automatic bakery in Dar es Salaam 
(let alone the other towns) would be of dubious financial 
viability and was a low priority for NMC resource use.
However, given the powers of the minister to determine the 
policy of the NMC, the agreed reality of the socio-economic 
problem (if not necessarily any detailed agreement on how 
large or critical it was) and NMC1s preliminary view that, 
while it would have a negligible profit on baking, it would 
not suffer any significant loss of overall investible surplus 
flow or financial viability, NMC's management was not well 
placed to do more than seek to modify and reduce the project.^ 
In particular it sought the elimination or indefinite post­
ponement of the upcountry bakeries.
The Ministry of Development Planning did not take a strong 
position on the project. At one stage it tentatively proposed 
proceeding on the bakery at Dar plus three of the upcountry 
units. There was no serious Devplan evaluation either of 
the financial or of the socio-economic aspects of the project 
beyond a somewhat artifactual note on the negative employment 
implications.
4. That the bakeries were minority community owned increased 
the potential explosiveness of the problem. It did net cause
it - the practices would have been condemned in African private 
sector (or for that matter public sector) firms.
5. Cooperative, small scale bakeries were not so much rejected 
after serious consideration as viewed as implausible. This 
view, based on their insignificant place in Dar es Salaam
bread supply in 1967 or the recent past, may have been inaccurate.
6. NMC’s own fixed investment priorities in the medium term 
lay in consolidating and expanding its wheat flour mill, 
modernizing and expanding its maize grinding and rice milling 
units and developing a series of modest sized decentralized 
tinning plants.
7. Indeed while NMC had a duty to point out the problems and 
costs of the proposal and request reconsideration, it would 
have been highly improper for it to have refused to proceed or 
to have used procedural sabotage to the same end. That would 
have been bureaucratic capitalist elitism.
7The Treasury, like NMC, was exceedingly dubious of the 
financial viability of the Dar project and certain of the 
financial unviability of the others. Its analysis suggested 
worse results than NMC's and its opposition - linked to 
NMC's - led to the cutback of the eventual decision to the 
Dar bakery only.
Like NMC, The Treasury faced real problems in pushing its 
position:
a. It was in no position to evaluate the socio-economic 
(much less potential political) cost of the adulter­
ation and shortweighting evils aimed at nor even to 
propose to Kilimo and Devplan how they could seek to 
evaluate them;
b. on purely financial grounds the project was weak but 
not to a degree (either in possible low returns relative 
to capital or in opportunity cost of alternative 
projects foregone) automatically disqualifying it;
c. therefore, Treasury almost perforce concentrated on 
chipping down the size of the project and seeking low 
opportunity cost foreign finance sources while 
accepting the Kilimo proposition that a priority socio­
economic case existed at least for Dar es Salaam.
Kilimo's support for the project was - at least in its 
contacts external to the ministry - common to all involved 
officials until well after the decision to proceed was 
taken. However, the Minister's socio-economic case became 
less clear in official presentations® and was mixed with 
agricultural sector mechanization, modernization and surplus 
generation.
No socio-economic cost or gain analysis was done (e.g. no 
estimate of total "bad" loaves per annum). No detailed 
consideration was given to devising alternative routes 
such as control over private bakeries by a corps of
8. In some cases what appeared was a general "food trade is 
too critical to be left in private hands" nlea for extending 
the public sector. This variant lacked the very specific 
reasons the minister had for wishing baking to be a priority 
area for public sector extension.
8inspectors^ or decentralised public sector small bakeries 
to reaching the goal of pure loaves of the stated weight; 
preliminary consideration suggested to officials that these 
simply would not work.
The basic problems with the decision taking in this case 
are clear:
a. the non-economistic goal was not quantified;
b. alternative means of achieving it were not canvassed;
c. therefore, the mildly negative surplus generation 
projections could not be compared with projected 
socio-economic gains.
These are general problems. However, in rural water - health - 
education programmes (and in analysis preceeding the articul­
ation of the capital shift to Dodoma) some work was done toward 
quantifying the non-economistic outputs (gains) to see 
whether they seem worth their probable resource input-costs.
In 1968-69 this trend had barely begun; even by 1976 it had 
some considerable way to go.l°
9. Tanzanian officials and politicians have a general distrust 
of inspectorates. They appear to share a gloomy view that 
in most cases inspectors cannot be paid enough to avert their 
becoming "employees" of those they are intended to control and 
that skilled personnel availability constraints will mean that 
many are not technically competent. The result has been 
political emphasis on political overseeing of managers and 
officials, on an elite central anti-corruption unit and on 
voluntary mass inspection bodies (e.g. consumers for the 
Prices Act) and official articulation of a number of small, 
relatively well paid specialist corps where inspection was 
clearly necessary (e.g. exchange control).
10. The argument is not for mystification via social cost benefit 
analysis which 'economizes' all gains into pseudo-accurate money 
terms. For one thing that form of 'single answer' data processing 
is not readily comprehensible to decision takers and is object­
ively a means for 'clever people' in analysis to warp decisions. 
What is needed is a clear statement of gains: e.g. approximate
hours water carrying time saved and/or number of families within 
1/4 mile of pure water point, reduction in number of adulterated 
and of short-weighted loaves of bread, additional market for 
locally produceable spare parts and simple machines. These can 
then be compared with costs (including the opportunity costs of 
other projects foregone). In the case of the Dodoma studies 
this was attempted. The value of creating a more balanced 
urban pattern and thereby a cumulative process of more 
decentralized location of production units far greater than 
the initial impact on Dodoma District was articulated. Costings 
were prepared showing that - taking account of both time 
discount and inflation - by 1990 or 1995 the true capital cost 
of keeping the capitol in Dar es Salaam would have exceeded that 
of moving it to Dodoma.. They also showed radically divergent 
costs for a phased (either 10 or 20 year) and a very hasty 
(under 5 year) move which presumably influenced the 1973 
decision to carry out the move over 1974/5 - 1984/5.
9IV
Costs, Designs, Consultants
The initial consultant's estimate of bakery cost in 1969 was 
Sh 11m (Sh 7 million of which was foreign exchange cost 
including 5.5 million for machinery). The preliminary contract 
price in 1971-2 came to Sh 15.9 million (of which Sh 10 million 
foreign exchange including Sh 7.8 million machinery). The 
preliminary actual figures by opening in 1975-76 came to about 
Sh 18 million (of which about Sh 11 million foreign exchange 
including Sh 7.8 million machinery).H
The first problem is the cost escalation - 45% (not 200% or 
"threefold" as sometimes claimed by contrasting the 1969 
machinery estimate with the 1971-2 preliminary contract 
costing for the entire bakery)12 from consultant in 1969 
to initial contract in 1971-2 and another 13% from contract 
to completion in 1975-6. The escalation was greatest for 
"local" costs (four to six to eight million shillings) but 
was also large for machinery including shipping because a 
hasty survey by Canadian based consultants with little 
East African experience led to very shaky guesses indeed as
to the cost of replicating Canadian buildings and transporting
and installing Canadian machinery in Tanzania. Escalation 
from consultants' estimates to actual contract of 25% was 
normal in Tanzania (and indeed elsewhere in East Africa) 
over 1968-72 but the bakery escalation of 45% was atypically
high, though not uniquely s o . 12
11. All of the foreign exchange data are direct import cost 
only. Thus they seriously underestimate the true foreign 
exchange cost of construction, e.g. they treat cement as local 
but the fuel, power, packaging, equipment, salaries import 
content of local cement is of the order of two thirds of 
total cost.
12. Very early on, lower 'back of envelope' calculations 
were tossed about. One of these may have been Sh 5 million 
(or a third the 1971/2 figure) but Sh 10 million quickly came 
to be the bottom of serious guesstimate ranges.
13. Construction costs were rising 6-8% a year for reasons 
including import and labour costs and probably widening profit 
margins in a sellers' market. Therefore from 1968 to 1972 
costs would have risen perhaps 25-30% on construction and 
10-20% on machinery. Adding on any bidder's rational allowance 
for cost escalation during implementation takes this to 35-50% 
on construction and 20-25% on machinery or 25-35% overall on an 
'average' medium sized project with a consultancy report about 
1968, a firm contract about 1971/72 and scheduled commissioning 
about 1973/74. Greater world inflation and its importation 
into Tanzania would make 'normal' escalation much higher today.
10
The 13% escalation to completion over the period 1971-2 to 
1975-6 is concentrated in the building where cost exploded 
upward by about two thirds. Here two problems interact.
The design chosen was expensive both in choice of design 
itself and the materials used as well as in total fees 
payable. The initial design chosen by the consultants posed 
serious construction problems given the Tanzanian construction 
industry's technical capabilities and capacity constraints.
This led to over a year's delay in completion and to some 
alterations to the design. Over 1971-2/1975-6 unit building 
costs rose at least 75% (probably nearer 100% for sophisticated 
buildings) which was far above any escalation envisaged in 
the 1971-2 figures. Probably about half the increase relates 
to general cost escalation external to the project and half 
to design difficulties (including cost escalations from delay).
The second problem is that of machinery cost. Both NMC and 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry's Industrial Studies 
Centre identified potential Continental European and Japanese 
suppliers who appeared to be prepared to supply and install 
comparable plant equally rapidly for Sh four to five million 
or about 51% to 64% of the sole Canadian supplier's price.
Even allowing for escalation in actual bids plus adding 
transport and installation costings, at least Sh two million 
could have been saved. The fact that this route might have 
forced unpackaging the building design - not seriously 
considered at the time - could further have reduced costs if 
NMC had used a local firm and standard Dar es Salaam factory 
design. In principle it would have had "learning by doing" 
gains - at the opportunity cost of NMC's not "learning by 
doing" on its flour mill - but if these had led to more 
automatic bakeries they would have been counterproductive 
as only the Dar one had any plausible case.
NMC's management pressed for securing a European supplier and 
had some Kilimo and some Devplan support. The Treasury 
vetoed the change. This, on the face of it very odd, Treasury 
position was based on the present discounted value (or true 
cost) of the alternative funds:
a. the European sources would have required either cash 
or commercial loan term payment - no soft aid was 
available (an attempt to secure it from the Netherlands 
had failed);14
b. the Japanese sources (never really seriously canvassed) 
might in principle have been financed under a semi-soft 
loan but that loan was not fully operational at the 
relevant time and its use always led to serious delays;
14. Negotiations with the Netherlands were abortive. Why is 
not clear - the inappropriateness of means proposed to social 
goal reason advanced would have applied even more strongly 
to the National Cold Chain which the Netherlands pushed very 
hard.
11
c. Canadian aid at 0% interest and 10 years grace plus 
40 years repayment was available but was tied to 
Canadian goods and services. Future Canadian capital 
aid allocations were believed (by CIDA and by Tanzania) 
to be becoming endangered by delay in finding projects 
to use existing allocations.
Treasury therefore saw the true repayment cost of the Canadian 
loan at not over 15% of its nominal amount versus a true 
cost of 100% of nominal cost for cash or commercial loan 
purchases from Germany. That appeared more than to offset 
the 40% nominal price difference. Further given the lag in 
Canadian aid use the opportunity cost was zero or negative.15 
What the Treasury did not consider was whether the Canadian 
package - which included building design - would greatly 
raise the cost of the portion of the project financed locally. 
Since the saving in true cost in the Canadian aid financed 
package versus a commercially financed alternative of the 
order of Sh 5.0 millionl6 was equal to the 1971-2 figure for 
total locally financed cost (and in retrospect to 70% of the 
1975-6 preliminary actual) such a calculation would not, in 
this case, have altered the decision to use Canadian finance 
unless major future spares cost differences had been identified 
as well as huge divergences in building costs.
The closely related third problem was the design consultant 
package taken in conjunction with the structure of the local 
architectural and design sector. The Canadian consultancy 
services (including design) were expensive (over Sh 1.2 million) 
partly because bargaining was difficult once the loan source 
was known and the fee included in the loan sum (and thus 
costing 15% of nominal amount), partly because the project 
was always treated as a "rush" matter albeit it did not 
proceed very rapidly, and partly because NMC was neither 
very expert in baking nor very eager to devote its own not 
insubstantial planning and design talents to this project.
The NMC position stemmed partly from the fact that the automatic 
bakery was not seen as its project but as an imposed one, from 
the management's need to devote major attention to the larger
15. Negative in that getting Canadian funds used in this 
project was perceived as potentially raising total future 
Canadian capital aid allocations to Tanzania available for 
other projects.
16. The rough calculation is that the Canadian package had a 
true foreign loan cost of Sh 1.5 million (15% of the nominal 
Sh 10 million) plus Sh 6.0 million local finance totalling
Sh 7.5 million. The alternative (commercial finance) package 
had a loan cost of Sh 7.5 million (Sh 7.5 million nominal and 
true cost because of lack of soft credit) plus Sh 6.0 million 
local finance for a total of Sh 13.5 million.
12
flour milling and maize milling projects and from the manage­
ment's (particularly the General Manager's) interest in 
trying to develop a pilot plant toward a series of multi­
product, modest-sized, decentralized tinning plants bolstering 
the economies of fruit and vegetable growing areas.17 jn 
these cases NMC's management did seek to unpackage, to 
achieve local (and suitable) building designs and to oversee 
in some detail. The automatic bakery's virtually turn-key 
approach (modified only where the design for the building 
led to insuperable construction problems in the course of 
implementation) was an exception not a rule for NMC.
The problems in the interaction of foreign and local design 
cost flowed from the structure of the Tanzanian sector. 
Architects, Quantity Surveyors and associates (some critics 
would say accomplices) still operated private sector, East 
Africa wide rate cartels. In banking the National Bank of 
Commerce had broken with these on its own initiative, in the 
case of insurance the National Insurance Corporation had 
(by 1972) done so almost as fully albeit after more govern­
ment encouragement. But in architecture a minimum fee of 
12 % % of building cost remained effective even when design 
was de facto prepared or procured by the client and all 
the architect did was drawings from it. The parastatal set 
up to handle design tended to charge cartel rates and, more 
critically, was too limited in capacity and competence to 
break the cartel. In construction the situation was at 
least as bad with a de facto cartel of a few firms able to 
do large or complex jobs. Of these was the quasi-public 
sector (later fully public sector) Company - Mecco - was 
the slowest, most expensive and technically most erratic.
Difficulties in decision taking can be Identified in the cost/ 
design areas:
a. while the low present cost of the Canadian funds almost
certainly made Canada the true low cost supplier, the
calculation process for comparing total costs (including 
spares and operations) among alternative suppliers was 
defective;
b. the issue of unpackaging - at least building design
and erection supervision - was never seriously canvassed;
17. This interest while not opposed by Kilimo had no serious 
backing there and somewhat greater Devplan and Treasury 
interest was supportive rather than initiating. All the 
initiative and adaptative thinking for the Muheza plant 
(which came into operation in 1976) must be credited to NMC.
13
the known weakness of the public design 
parastatals and the resultant price and 
a limited, shrinking private sector did 
serious initiatives to enhance relevant 
capacity.16
and construction 
of depending on 
not lead to 
public sector
V.
What Alternatives - Adequate Pure Bread Supplies
Alternative discussion to be relevant must be within two 
constraints:
a. ending the adulteration, short weighting evil at 
which the automatic bakery was aimed;
b. avoiding state financing of major private productive 
sector expansion especially by firms viewed as lacking 
major technical competence and as engaging in dubious 
product and fiscal practices (i.e. most existing private 
bakeries) . ^
Thus criticism suggesting that the existing private bakers 
should have been allowed (or helped by public sector financial 
institution loans) to expand is simply irrelevant. That 
route would have violated both constraints.Suggesting 
assisting new private bakeries (presumptively by citizens 
of African ancestry) might or might not have met the first 
constraint but would certainly have been viewed as a negative 
contribution to a transition to socialism.
Basically four alternative^ might have been seen as consistent 
with the goals of the bakery project and with national strategy 
as perceived by the TANU Executive Committee and the President:
18. No such decision could have done much for the bakery 
project. The time to turn it into institutional capacity 
would have been too long. However, the failure through 
1975-76 to act effectively, despite a series of cases 
illustrating the urgency, left construction in 1977 as one 
of the two (the other being road transport) disaster sub­
sectors of the economy in terms not merely of hiah cost but 
of a private run down not matched by public sector capacity 
growth leading to very serious physical bottlenecks. (Design - 
while still weak - appeared by 1975-6 to be less critically 
limited than construction.)
19. As a characterization of all bakeries this was too sweeping. 
Both technical competence and practices varied. However, there 
was a distinct tendency (of consumers, political decision 
takers and public sector officials) to perceive them as an 
undifferentiated mass.
20. For more details on the private firms see S.M. Wangwe,
Choice of Technology and Technological Change in Industry:
A Case Study of Tanzanian Bakeries', ERB Seminar Paper, 30-8-77.
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a. the automatic bakery or a series of small bakeries 
run by NMC;
b. a series of small bakeries run by decentralized public 
sector units;
c. controls over existing bakers to enforce ingredient 
and weight standards;
d. a cooperative bakery and bread marketing sector of - 
say - 40/50 units.
NMC1s management believed that for it to ooerate several 
small units in Car es Salaam as opposed to one large one 
would raise skilled personnel requirements and cost levels.
It based this view on experience with small nationalized 
maize and rice mills and the nature of its own operating/ 
management structure. No one challenged this NMC view which 
was almost certainly valid given its high level manpower 
constraints and the pressures already resulting from its 
citizenization and expansion programmes.
There was no technical impediment to small bakeries. 1967 
Industrial Studies Center pre-feasibility studies (and 
experience elsewhere in both East and West Africa) demonstrated 
that. Indcentre's cost estimate of Sh 5.5 million would 
probably have been revised to Sh 7.0-8.0 million by pre­
contract and Sh 9.0-10.5 million by completion but at each 
stage would have been below (5.5 vs 11.0, 7-8 vs 16, 9-10.5 vs 
18) the automatic bakery's capital cost. Further, an earlier 
completion than 1975-76 (or even than the 1974 target) would 
have been possible. Equally import costs would have been 
lower and the buildup of spares and replacement machinery 
demand of a type suitable for local manufacture in the 1980s 
higher.21
The problem was not technical in the sense of a feasible 
production option other than an automated bakery nor - in this 
case - even in any particular desire for 'high technology' 
on the part of the NMC (which did not want the project), nor 
by the Treasury (which wanted a low capital cost on what it 
viewed as a socio-economic more than a directly productive 
project). Kilimo (Agriculture) may have preferred the modern 
technology - certainly it had a general tendency over 1968-72
21. This point is perhaps close to 20:20 vision in hindsight. 
Systematic argument for building up machinery and spares 
capacity began in the University in about 1971-2, the Treasury 
and Mincom in 1972, the TIB, Devplan and Kilimo in 1974. It 
did not exist over 1968-71. Implementation began with foundry 
expansion in 1972, spares production in textiles plants in 
1975-76, the conversion of the TAZARA construction workshops 
into a machinery and spares complex in 1977.
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to seek large scale, plant, and machinery intensive investment 
to raise its Ministerial-Parastatal Development Budget vote 
and the share of it identifiable as 'directly productive 
plant and machinery'. Both its more conservative technocratic 
and its 'production socialist' officials pushed this line as 
a means to maximizing output, surplus and modernity.22
The real difficulty was that there was no evident decentralized 
public sector institution to operate small bakeries. Prior 
experience with an ill planned and articulated mixed parastatal 
plus co-op marketing structure (COSATA) had left both officials 
and politicians wary of proposing 'green field' sectoral 
developments at the small scale, public sector level. The 
Treasury - at the relevant period engaged in a study of local 
government tax mechanisms and administration that shed a 
lurid light on their managerial weakness - never considered 
the idea of Dar es Salaam City Council owned bakeries as a 
serious one. It did back initial steps to decentralization -
e.g. the District Development Fund - but in areas in which 
capacity to implement was fairly clear and in which initial 
failures would not be disastrous. It did not see Dar bakeries 
as meeting either test.22 NMC had already experienced grave
22. This was even more evident in the case of the Tanga 
Fertilizer Company. In that case an added debacle was an 
apparent intra Kilimo official disorganization (or difference 
of opinion) leading to Kilimo micro crop and research officer 
data and projections for fertilizer demand being substituted 
for a macro projection which Kilimo's planning apparatus was 
unable or unwilling to provide. The costs in terms of too 
'generalized' a plant and too vague a set of early year 
production targets were significant. Foreign exchange 
movements, the choice of a contractor and partner with no 
real prior experience in fertilizer plant construction or 
operation, the failure to work out bulk transport facilities 
(as vital and costly at the initial Dar as at the final Tanga 
location) in good time, the failure to develop a viable 
relationship between the public sector producer and public 
sector buyers to allow orderly year round production and 
shipment, the six month Israeli blockade of the phosphate 
supply port of Aq'aba, and a fortiori the over 50% 1967-71 
fall in landed fertilizer price (during a dumping war) had 
even greater effects on the plant's viability until the 1973-75 
fertilizer price explosion and physical shortage demonstrated 
that it could be viable even if far from ideal.
23. The Dar es Salaam Development Corporation postdates the key 
decisions on the bakery. Its real - if uneven - capacity to run 
a number of small commercial units combined with its problems at 
the time of initially taking them over suggests that the bakeries 
as a 'sink or swim' first project might well have meant 'sink'.
In practice the (former) Dar City Council had a tendency to 
esculate capital requirements to increase project size and 
modernity - vide Kariakoo Market vs the canvassed alternative
of four zonal markets and a modernization of the original Kariakoo - 
so that it might well have ended with one to five smaller 
automated bakeries not ten small mechanized ones.
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problems in keeping its joint venture with the decentralized 
public sector - National Distributors in Dar es Salaam - 
reasonably efficient in meeting consumer demand and wanted no 
additional ventures on that basis. Finally, the national 
trend to centralization turned in 1970-71 (the DDF, the TANU 
decision calling for decentralization and the Pratt-Nsekela 
Report which worked out the guidelines for it) so that the 
bakery project was b o m  in the last months of a centralizing 
not a decentralizing ethos.
Co-operative ownership of mechanical bakeries would have posed 
similar operational capacity problems to decentralized 
parastatal. It would also have posed a political or strategic 
difficulty. Co-ops by 1968 (and a fortiori by 1971-72) were 
not seen as unambiguously conducive to a transition to social­
ism. ^ 4 In the case of urban production co-operatives (a 
fairly successful example of which existed in the road 
transport field in Dar) the problem was that if using significant 
capital and achieving reasonable results they became de facto 
private partnerships outside public and Party control and 
leading to greater inequality. Whatever their merits for 
grouping low income craftsmen to achieve decent output and 
return levels, these seemed irrelevant to a Sh 6-10 million 
project based on public finance and serving the lower income 
population of the capital.
Control of existing bakeries also posed problems to which no 
solutions were perceived at the time. To hire a corps of 
inspectors would have been expensive especially as unless 
they were well paid they would have been very tempted indeed 
to become corrupt. To have citizens check bread to see 
whether ingredients and weight were as posted (a method used 
with some success both in limiting and detecting abuses in 
later price control legislation) was only too evidently 
unworkable because checking prices against published lists 
is easier than weighing bread, much less assaying its ingredients
Control by nationalization would have posed the same management 
problems as a new plant (or plants). Prior experience with 
small grain mills (owned by basically similar businessmen) 
was that using ex-owners as managers without close supervision
24. The main struggle turned on the rural - not the urban - 
co-ops and their rural elite leadership with its national apex 
in the Co-operative Union of Tanzania. Over 1969-72 the 
Ujaama Village Programme, the removal of agricultural finance 
from CUT to Treasury parastatal hands and the removal of 
certain regional Federation leaderships marked a major cutback 
in Co-op power and one intended to further egalitarianism, 
participation and socialism. The 1974-76 moves to link 
villages directly to parastatals (national, district or 
regional) and the abolition of the old line co-operatives 
marked the conclusion of this political campaign.
17
was disastrous and that the reorganizing of non-similar, 
small, antiquated units was not easy; especially when an odd 
jumble of other activities (from supermarkets through soft 
drink bottling to oil expressing and boarding houses) was 
associated with them.2 J
A more radical simple technology option might have been 
canvassed.26 This would have required of the order of 
40-50 2,000 loaf a day bakeries based on brick ovens with 
hand mixing, weighing, moulding and wrapping. The equipment 
and building could, at least in principle, be produced by 
the informal sector.
Cost - excluding the buildings - might be Sh 5,000 cash 
(Sh 20,000 including direct labour investment) for a co­
operative bakery and perhaps Sh 6,500 cash (Sh 27,500 total) 
including the building. The total capital cost thus would, 
on the face of it, be about Sh 1.4 million (Sh 0.3 million 
cash) for 50 small, cooperative built and operated bakeries. 
Further the import content would be low and the technology, 
in principle at least, well within the cooperative members 
control both as to use and reproduction.
Why then was this alternative not seriously canvassed?
Indcentre glanced at it to reject it in favour of mechanized, 
non-automatic bakeries.
a. in Dar es Salaam (in 1967 or 1976) no significant 
amount of bread was produced in this way;
b. the experience with trying to assist the 'informal 
sector' had not been a happy one (for the informal 
sector or the bodies seeking to interact with it);
c. in the absence of any existing body of small hand 
bakeries and of any overt interest in the field a very 
considerable government initiative would have been 
needed to get rapid buildup of such baking capacity;
d. because the mechanized bakeries (some much more 
mechanized than others) had virtually swept the Dar 
market at dates not precisely known but well before 1967 
and had well developed materials procurement and delivery
to retailer (including retailers on 'rural routes') systems,
25. It is not clear that Kilimo ever did suggest nationalizing 
existing bakeries as a serious alternative. It too had been 
stunned by the small grain mill mess as it became clear
over 1968-9. If the suggestion was seriously canvassed, the 
clear NMC-Treasury opposition prevented it from becoming a 
live alternative.
26. This point was raised by Raphie Kaplinsky in comments on 
an earlier draft of this paper. His Kenya work (albeit a 
decade later) supplies much of the data used. The conclusions, 
however, are the author's.
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it appeared that some form of administrative protection 
or market reservation would be needed to allow any new 
hand baking sector to survive.
In retrospect this rather cursory dismissal looks to have
been formally inadequate but by no means self evidently
substantively wrong:
a. in large African urban markets - e.g. Accra, Ibadan - 
studies have shown mechanized (in these cases often 
African mechanized) bakeries gradually replacing hand 
bakeries;
b. the key advantages of the mechanized bakeries were in 
material procurement and marketing (including getting 
loaves to shops) even in patterns of shops and markets 
at least as decentralized as Dar es Salaam's;
c. costings on pilot cooperative projects are often far 
below what replication without free technical assistance 
actually costs (albeit a 2 to 3 fold increase in capital 
cost would still leave the hand bakeries radically 
superior on that count);
d. in the absence of a pool of hand baking expertise and 
of successful producer cooperative experience general- 
izeable to new ventures getting 40/50 - as opposed to 
2 to 4 - bakeries running with a minimum degree of 
effectiveness even over 3 to 4 years would have involved 
training and support of a type which Tanzania was quite 
incompetent to provide;
e. the potential lower operating cost of the bakeries (some­
what in doubt if they provided employment or self 
employment at or about minimum wage levels (as did most 
successful informal sector manufacturing - processing 
units) would have turned on using wood or charcoal 
rather than oil, gas or electricity (actually some 
mechanized bakeries in Dar do use wood or charcoal). 
Whether that substitution would be sensible on ecological 
or medium term economic grounds is open to doubt - the 
ways in which rising urban demand for charcoal and wood 
are being met in East Africa are alarmingly destructive 
whatever their import substitution side;
f. the mechanical bakeries would have been able to drive 
out the cooperative hand bakeries, or most of them, 
unless a first rate joint distribution system had been 
set up and the government had made very clear it was 
committed to seeing that their bread was handled by 
retailers - a conclusion only too harshly underlined 
by the experience of Dar Development Corporation 
commercial units which might have been supposed to fac< 
lesser marketing/procurement problems and to have greater 
ability to withstand predatory competition.
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That said it remains a clear weakness in the 1968-69 process 
that no serious effort was made to see whether there was 
any interest in hand baking by informal sectoral artisans, 
no attempt to set up one or two test units and no attempt 
to interest NMC in providing procurement/marketing services 
and advice to the initial cooperative hand bakeries to see
what could be achieved.
With the virtues of hindsight an alternative can now (1976-77) 
be seen:
a. a series of quick prosecutions (using plain clothes 
detectives to get evidence) in 1968 and at uneven 
intervals thereafter to limit abuse;
b. a pilot mechanized bakery by NMC decided on in 1968 
for 1970 completion;
c. a training programme at that bakery over 1970-74;
d. identify and support a group (or groups) interested in
creating one to three test cooperative, small scale, 
hand bakeries;
e. experiment with ways of providing procurement and 
marketing services to the hand bakery that allowed it 
to operate effectively and to survive predatory 
competition from the private mechanical bakeries without 
smothering it or'de facto taking over its management;
f. by 1970-72 deciding on the basis of experience what
mix of mechanical and hand bakeries and what procurement/ 
distribution system would meet consumer, worker and 
general political goals best and move to implement 
that mix through supporting additional unit creation;
g. nationalization of the private bakeries in 1975.
However, the degree of clairvoyance needed to see that 
sequence in 1968-71 would have been worthy of Merlin, 
Cassandra, or a Swahili seer. Further, the opportunity 
cost in terms of planning and management capacity would have 
been high. One problem with the bakery decision taking 
process and project was that NMC, Kilimo (at official albeit 
not Ministerial levels), Devplan and Treasury all gave it 
very secondary and episodic attention because of the pressure 
of other demands. Whether they could or would have devoted 
the resources to make the alternative work - and at what cost 
to other decisions and projects - is not clear.
The issues posed in the analysis of alternatives are in a 
different context today - one of strategy for decentralization 
and, less uniformly, for the technically simple - but the 
actual problems remain relevant:
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a. identifying technically practicable alternative 
technologies and costing them (as was, indeed, at least 
partly done);
b. identifying institutionally practicable agencies for 
implementation of each technology (attempted unsuccess­
fully albeit perhaps halfheartedly);
c. having some guidelines as to what degree of risk, of 
project cost and of initial institutional weakness are 
acceptable if they contribute to decentralized public 
sector operations and to the use of simpler, less 
capital intensive technologies (not available in the 
bakery case and still very weak in 1976).
VI
What Alternatives - Phase Down Wheat Bread
The 'alternative' of limiting bakery capacity growth to limit
the use of bread and thus to save foreign exchange has had a 
relatively long academic and bureaucratic 'underworld' life 
in Dar es Salaam. It is formally advanced by Coulson 
apparentlv as having been a live option for decision takers 
in 1968-71.
There are several problems with such a contention for that 
period:
a. Kilimo stated that wheat production would probably 
reach demand by the early 1970s (as indeed it seemed
to do in one year), thus the foreign exchange saving
argument was the subject of debate not a baseline for 
further analysis;
b. bread was (and is) consumed by a majority of the urban 
population and was thus perceived by the Party and the 
government as a good which it was obligated to keep 
available at a reasonable price and to hold to a 
reasonable quality;
c. limiting bakery capacity would not per se have reduced 
use of wheat flour (and thereby saved foreign exchange) 
as opposed to pushing it into household or 'backyard' 
baking;
d. if a real supply limit on bread and flour had been 
imposed the politically, socially, administratively 
and economically undesireable alternatives of a 
'parallel' market in bread/flour with queues and 
favouritism or of bread/flour rationing with longer 
queues, a bit more corruption and - perhaps - a bit
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9 7less favouritism would have ensued;^'
e. limiting bread availability would hardly have eliminated
adulteration and short weighing - quite the reverse!
These very real problems are why limits on wheat and sugar 
use stayed in an 'underworld' rather than emerging into 
serious political/technical debate until 1974's very acute 
foreign exchange crisis. Banning sugar imports and seeking to 
fill the gap with jaggery was debated in 1974 and in October 
was applied (albeit relatively briefly and in the context of 
price increases and of sugar capacity due to come into 
production which was expected to make the gap narrow and 
transitory). Banning wheat imports was not viewed as plausible 
enough to canvass seriously even then. The situation 
remains embrangled by the wildly erratic views on whether 
Tanzania can become self sufficient in wheat - views which 
tend to overresoond to preliminary feasibility reports and 
recent crop outturns with a volatility that looked at in 
retrospect or from outside seems incredible. As of 1976-8 
there has been a partial break-through in public sector 
production and identification of possible new areas for it, 
but reorganizing the Basuto scheme took well over half a 
decade so that it would be at least as rash to predict self 
sufficiency (taking one year with another) from 1981 
onward as to claim self sufficiency was permanently 
unattainable.
The most cogent short term initiatives have related to 
potential use of non-wheat flour in bread. They have come 
largely from State House. Some sub-units in Kilimo are 
enthusiastic but there has been no real institutional drive 
to implement and NMC has indicated a capacity to adapt if 
such flour becomes available rather than demonstrating a 
real priority to use resources to build up purchasing and 
grinding c a p a c i t y . O v e r  1974-76 cassava was indeed used
27. When wheat flour ran short in early 1974 precisely this 
happened. Bakeries and stores with bread limited customers 
(or most customers) to one loaf. Long queues were standard.
Some initial buyers resold at a profit (charging for the saving 
of one hour to those who bought from them) some civil service 
and company messengers were misused to secure bread for their 
'superiors', some bread came out from 'under the counter' or 
went 'out the back door' at illegal prices. Abuses were 
surprisingly low if public comment is a good guide, as in Dar 
it usually is, but the shortage was not very long lived and 
abuse would probably have grown over time.
28. Over 1973-5 the alternative grains and cassava were in 
scarce supply conditioning NMC's response toward waiting. If 
millet, sorghum, maize and cassava are in easy supply consistently 
over 1978-80 NMC can more reasonably be expected to expedite 
studies on how flour incorporating 25% of them could be prepared 
and distributed instead of 100% wheat flour as a standard (not
an 'inferior' alternative) product.
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in blends but with maize meal (which poses less technical 
problems because its basic use patterns are not centered on 
baking) rather than wheat flour. The inherent technical 
problem is that wheat flour can contain carbon dioxide and 
thus rise in the baking process whereas other flours cannot 
or can do so only to a much more limited extent.
A 25% reduction in wheat use for any level of flour consumption 
almost certainly would allow reaching and holding domestic 
self-sufficiency in wheat production/use. The automatic 
bakery as designed is most unhelpful in that respect; its 
technology requires a proportion of imported hard wheat 
(currently not growable in Tanzania at all) and is not 
readily adaptable to blends with other grains (or roots).
The problems for decisions arising from the 'cut down on 
wheat use' debate include:
a. achieving reasonable projections of local output of 
currently imported raw materials;
b. linked with technical and financial studies of alter­
native (in full or part) local inputs;
c. plus clearer identification of what goods are considered 
worker and peasant necessities and therefore to be kept 
readily available at prices reasonable in relation to 
worker and peasant incomes;
d. more automatically including such macro or sectoral 
issues in micro-project analysis, discussion and 
decision taking.
VII
Problems At The Operational Stage
The automatic bakery seems to be likely to produce 40,000-60,000 
loaves of bread a day in the near future i.e. to be at 12 to 
18,000,000 loaves a year versus a capacity of 30,000,000.
It can do so and is able to sell that output. If demand 
rises 10% a year from 1976 through 1980 it should be in the 
65,000-90,000 range plus whatever 'bread equivalent' output 
it has built up - a somewhat Iona but not evidently unsound 
runup to full capacity use.29
29. Especially given rapid inflation a plant whose initial 
output is at least 30-35% of capacity (one full shift) and 
whose demand growth will result in three shift operation 
within six years is likely to have a lower oresent cost than 
three smaller plants built consec ively. Evidently that 
is a rule of thumb requiring che ng against the technical 
and cost specificities of indi cases.
\
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NMC bread is more costly to produce than small private 
bakery bread - at least in terms of Price Commission costings 
using historic cost in respect of the private sector's 
capital stock. This apparently forced a bread price .05 
to .10 cents higher than would otherwise have been the case 
in 1975. However, any new bakeries would have had higher 
capital (and thus depreciation and interest) costs. The 
higher price may be more apparent than real.3°
Before the new plant came on stream the private bakeries 
were nearing the effective limit of their capacity. Whether 
they would have expanded at 1973 bread prices is unclear.
The new bakery coincided with higher bread prices, raw 
material shortages and the stagnant demand pattern of 
1974-75 leading to a significant 1976 surplus capacity in 
the private sector and at the Automatic Bakery.31
The initial goal of pure bread of proper weight seems to 
have dropped out of the centre of attention. The private 
bakeries are still producing (about half the Dar market) 
and are still not very closely regulated. There does not 
appear to be a broad body of complaints as to their products 
but whether this represents a real change and, if so, whether 
it flows from the NMC operation is unclear.
No total closing of private bakeries (as envisaged in 1968-71 
at least by some automatic bakery proponents) was canvassed 
over 1975-76. NMC alone could barely meet the demand even 
at 100% of capacity operation. At full capacity it could, 
however, cut its price. Buildup to full capacity output has 
been expected to take time and face learning problems. 
Literally putting the employees of the private bakeries into 
unemployment has not been politically attractive. The Dar 
Development Corporation neither had the desire nor was seen 
as having the capacity, to run the bakeries were they 
nationalized.32
30. As noted by Kaplinsky in his comment hand bakeries might 
have been cheaper yet. Assuming returns to labour at minimum 
wage levels, lower depreciation and fuel should have offset 
higher unit labour costs. However, beyond neighbourhood sales 
higher distribution costs - or inability to distribute - miaht if 
West African experience is any guide) have more than cancelled 
out this ex-oven cost saving.
31. See Wangwe op.clt. 1968-74 had seen a rise in demand. The 
1974-76 'fall' reported by private sector bakers to Wangwe is 
probably largely accounted for by the Automatic Bakery's capturing 
50% of a stagnant Dar market. 1976-77 seems to have been marked 
by a revival of growth in bread sales.
32. The collapse of DDC/DEDC operation of butcher shops in 1977 
underlines the point. True it was avoidable but there is no 
reason to suppose the failure to overcome long identified 
problems in the meat trade (and the blatant attempts to cover DDC 
short-comings by blaming others and seeking de facto operating 
subsidies) would not have pertained to baking as well.
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The bread price could be five to ten cents lower had an early, 
tentative line of NMC - Treasury discussion been worked 
through. The Treasury had agreed that in principle the NMC 
had some claim to having its micro costs from the Canadian 
package offset by generous onlending terms. Granted, neither 
NMC nor the Treasury saw the cost difference as being Sh 2 to 
2.5 million at the time as opposed to a final sum over three 
times as large, it is probably unfortunate that the issue 
was not followed through by either side.
It can be argued that any NMC series of principal and interest 
payments which provides the Treasury with Sh 11 million on 
dates as soon as or earlier than its repayment obligations 
to Canada entails no absolute loss to the Treasury. It does 
entail an opportunity cost of a surplus in time and money 
otherwise achieved and useable for other projects. To hold 
down the price of a staple mass market consumer good might be 
seen as an acceptable case for incurring such an opportunity 
cost (though less cogently so for an absolute loss).
Were NMC to have been lent about Sh 4 million face value 
repayable at the end of 25 years with interest at 6% the 
Treasury would have been in funds to meet its obligations.
NMC would (partly coincidentally) have had a debt obligation 
equal to the lowest cost foreign machinery offer but at better 
credit terms. The interest saving would have been say 
Sh 360,000 a year and that in depreciation (assuming NMC 
valued the machinery at Sh 4 million and did not enter other 
external costs such as consultancy and design) Sh 750,000-^ 
for the first ten years. The total saving of Sh 1.1 million 
would allow a ten cent a loaf price reduction on a 35,000 
loaf a day volume. At higher volumes the wider spread of 
fixed costs would maintain viability at the lower price. If
desired, of course, this solution could still be implemented 
albeit averting or limiting a price or, rather, price 
increases in 1975-76 would have been a greater good than 
achieving a cut in 1978.34
The more general problems for decision taking arising at this 
stage include:
a. how to apportion the national gain on a soft loan
between the Treasury (and/or other financial inter­
mediary) and the final user, especially if there are 
micro costs to the user associated with use of tied 
credit;
33. This assumes NMC would use a new loan to build a new 
bakery when the existing one wears out so depreciation is a 
'counterpart' to meeting its debt obligation.
34. The Treasury would now incur a loss on this scheme because 
the Tanzania Shilling has been devalued against the Canadian 
dollar. However, in general the Treasury has accepted that 
it, not the user parastatal, should carry the exchange rate 
risk on funds on-lent from foreign sources to parastatals via 
the Treasury.
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b. to what extent potential investible surplus on a 
transaction should be allocated to holding down the 
price of a basic consumption or production good and 
to what extent to financing additional capacity of 
that or other products;
c. how in the case of a project with a long gestation 
period the initial goals can be kept in mind (on record) 
and results tested against them (e.g. bread quality and 
weight in this case);
d. how sub-sectoral review can be routinized to ensure 
that particular problems are actually overcome not 
simply repeated at 10-15 year intervals. (In this 
case the issue of decentralized public sector units 
remains alive as dramatically illustrated by Dar 
butchery reprivatisation. By the mid 1980s the 
choices of large vs small plant, simple vs complex 
technology and decentralized vs centralized parastatal 
operation will arise again in baking as the capacity 
limit of the automated bakery and the mechanized 
bakeries are approached. The issue is whether Tanzanian 
bodies will have taken steps to be better able to analyze, 
propose, discuss, decide and implement. The 1977 Dar 
butchery case does not give grounds for a very optimistic 
prognosis as of 1978).
VIII
'Production Socialism1 and the Automated Bakery
Certain of the criticisms of the automated bakery, appear to 
be mutually contradictory (indeed antagonistic). This is
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especially true of the 'production socialist1 critique.
35. In the Tanzania context those widely designated (by 
themselves or others) as 'production socialists' have usually 
stressed:
a. a maximization of fixed investment and particularly of 
fixed investment in plant and machinery (presumtively 
on the F'eldman closed economy growth maximization 
version of the F 'eldman-Harodd-Domar model);
b. a maximization of investible surplus accumulation by 
the public sector to finance 'a' (with quite divergent 
views on use of foreign finance to augment this);
c. usually 'advanced' techniques to facilitate surplus 
extraction (a la Dobb and Bettelheim models or their 
capitalist mirror image the Galenson-Leibenstein model);
d. rapid phasing out of the Private Productive sector 
(including co-operatives) in favour of communal or 
parastatal units).
e. holding down both social service and personal consumption 
growth to allow rapid plant and machinery investment growth 
to achieve rapid GDP growth (a la a Mahalanobis model or 
indeed Soviet 1930s practice but contrary to Maoist 
priorities);
f. increasing technical and managerial efficiency (to use 
the plant and equipment more productively) within the 
public sector;
g. broadening the base and extent of worker and peasant 
participation in decision taking i.e. debureaucratizing, 
hierarchy unbuilding, small unit power increasing;
h. tightening central planning and ideological control by
a small advanced cadre to avoid decisions deviating from
nationally efficient resource use and central political 
control to penalize any deviation from national political 
goals;
i. reducing inequalities in consumption power rapidly (by
cutting at the top) and participation (by enhancing at 
the bottom) but not diverting resources from communal to 
personal nor future to present use.
Most have net faced several blatent contradictions among these
goals and indeed within some of then; and those who have (e.g.
John Saul) have not reached very convincing syntheses. This 
summary - which evidently is not in a form its proponents would 
accept - tries to bring together points made by the more
radical members of the Ini’ ty of Dar es Salaam Faculty,
ihey are by no means in ccmt agreement with each other so
that any brief sketch does v ice to one or more on some themes.
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Its criticisms of the bakery decision include:36
a. the project was designed to generate a large surplus;
b. it would increase NMC control over the food distribution 
sector;
c. NMC's general manager was also a private sector capitalist 
and favoured it;
d. the existing bakeries could have expanded;
e. a simpler technology with a lower capital cost and more
employment generation could have been used;
f. the automatic bakery was unlikely to generate large 
surpluses because too high a price was paid for it as a
result of the use of tied funds and inadequate use of
negotiations;
g. wheat flour consumption should have been discouraged 
because it would lead to higher imports.
The first criticism is neither production nor socialist oriented. 
Subject to appropriate constraints (in this case producing 
bread of adequate quality at a reasonable price) public 
directly productive investment should be organized to yield 
investible surpluses for reinvestment. In any case the 
initiative for the project was quite unrelated to surplus 
generation.
The second criticism is somewhat baffling. For a public 
sector parastatal to increase its weight in the staple food 
production/distribution sector at the expense of private 
firms would appear to be a desireable step so far as promoting 
a transition to socialism is concerned.
The third point is an expression of dislike or distrust. To 
the extent it was a statement about a decision, it was refighting
36. Apart from the Coulson paper these criticisms have 
been largely verbal or in passim asides in works not dealing 
with the bakery decision as such in any detail.
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of the (for the critics) lost battle about initial NYC 
management.37 if NMC would achieve large surpluses and more 
power and basic food production and distribution through 
the project, the fact that a General Mananer suggested such 
actions can hardly be seen as disloyalty or capitalist 
roading. In fact, as noted earlier, the General Manager of 
the NMC did not initiate the project and queried it as 
likely to hamper NMC surplus and (other) key operations 
development. Once Kilimo's position and the minister's 
commitment to it were clear, he supported the project and 
sought to ensure that it did not materially damage NMC.
The fourth criticism blandly ignores that the existing 
bakeries were private sector. Perhaps more immediately 
critical, it also refused to take note of the fact that 
the whole issue arose because they were believed to be 
exploiting poor workers, in the vernacular as well as the 
technical meaning of the term,, by adulteration and short- 
weighting.
Thus the simpler technology criticism while valid in the 
abstract requires either a demonstration of its appropriate­
ness for NMC or identification of an alternative public 
sector implementer if it were to be cogent in the actual 
context. To have financed private sector mechanized bakeries 
would hardly either have dealt with the immediate problem or 
furthered a transition to socialism.
37. NMC management had been the subject of a long drawn out 
decision. The choices were:
a. to hire each ex-owner to manage his former unit with
little control and much oversight (of the wrong definition);
b. to hire a new expatriate management with no East African 
experience;
c. to hire the Kenya based Unga (ex-owners of the largest 
mill) as managing agents;
d. to hire J.K. Chande (ex-part owner and General Manager
of the second largest mill) to provide a management team.
The real debate was between the last two options - the first 
was increasingly seen as disastrous and the second as dubiously 
feasible or desireable. Kilimo favoured Unga (as did most 
outside commentators) on the grounds of 'proved capacity'.
The Treasury favoured Chande on grounds of a much lower price 
contract, a better training record, absence of the conflict 
of interest which Kenyan milling units necessarily entailed 
and citizenship. Unga settled the decision (which was already 
swinging against them) by demanding almost immediate acceptance 
of their terms backed by a threat to withdraw staff. They were 
promptly told to leave at once and the contract with the 
Chande team signed. The NMC-Chande was a success and did 
lead to NMC being in a position to engage in self management 
at its conclusion in 1973.
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The sixth criticism's first branch that the bakery was unlikely 
to generate a surplus was a logical one and has proven valid 
in the event. It was not unique to the 'production socialists'. 
NMC, the Tanzania Investment Bank, and Treasury thought the 
same. The second branch that tied aid raised costs of 
machinery, building and design is true in nominal price 
terms but untrue in real resource cost terms. These amounted 
to a no interest loan at no opportunity cost in terms of 
other projects foregone. That more attention to trying to 
unpackage the building design and to bargaining on other 
cost items would have been desireable is a valid point.
How to do that in a tied, soft loan context is a problem.
The Treasury and TIB have found it exceedingly hard to 
tackle that problem systematically or effectively not for 
lack of attention but for want of leverage unless the project 
or plant or service contract negotiating is done before the 
soft loan is concluded.
The final criticism is per se invalid if local production 
can be built up to equal demand at a reasonable real resource 
cost and/or a no import position can be achieved by blending 
wheat with other flour. If wheat imports are inevitable 
unless demand is deliberately curbed, the criticism implies 
either that wheat flour is a luxury good with a narrow 
market (untrue), that requiring changes in patterns of 
staple foodstuff consumption should be undertaken by the 
state for marginal foreign exchange savings (a question of 
the true costs of such coercion and of basic values on which 
TANU's leadership would probably disagree with the critics 
for practical and ideological reasons), and/or that the 
future foreign balance projections are so bad that every 
non-subsistence consumption good must be cut out (palpably 
untrue in 1968, arguable in 1974 although still a matter on 
which disagreement on both practical and value grounds was 
possible, much harder to assert in 1978).
The muddle in the criticisms reflects a basic antagonistic 
contradiction in the 'production socialist' position. On the 
one hand it pushes for more investment in plant and machinery, 
more and tighter control over decision taking, less tolerance
38. Building up alternative lines of soft credit in frame 
agreements and then shopping about for suppliers before 
determining which frame credit to draw upon has been used by 
the Treasury and financial parastatals in this regard. It 
is by no means a complete answer - especially since the gaps 
in lines of credit adequate for large projects are bigger than 
the gap filling capacity of untied lines of credit available.
The Mtibwa and Kilombero sugar mill finance negotiations 
both illustrated (in slightly different ways) the real (even 
though not negligible) limits to negiation when the credit 
source is known, the purchase limited to one country and the 
number of suppliers in that country very small (often one as 
in the bakery case and Kilombero II).
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of actions based on small group or individual gain, more 
surplus for growth at the expense of mass social services and 
consumption goods. This sounds rather more like Denis Healey 
than Chairman Mao and also more like Joseph Stalin than 
President. Nyerere. It is basically restrictionist and elitist. 
At the same time it is deeply suspicious of investible 
surplus producing parastatals and their managers because it 
perceives them as likely (or certain for some critics) to 
perpetuate state capitalism and to block a transition to 
socialism.
In principle it is committed to worker and peasant self 
management preferably in small units with simple technologies 
and wishing both mass based and decentralized decisions.
This is Maoist, in some cases more Maoist than Chairman Mao, 
but this branch of the argument is not readily compatible 
with avoiding some mistaken or uncoordinated decisions nor 
with the earlier quest for lowering present priority to 
meeting immediate peasant and worker needs in favour of 
fixed investment.
The two halves of the case are in fundamental conflict - 
especially as the second even on technical grounds requires 
higher priority to investment (or expenditure or resource 
allocation, whichever term one prefers) on adult and primary 
education, rural health, pure water, housing and basic 
consumer goods as ends and means to achieving growth and 
less emphasis on 'plant and machinery' as ends in themselves 
as posited by the first half.
This bluntly put the 'production socialist' position may 
appear silly. Certainly there is a tendency for both capitalist 
and orthodox Marxist critics to dismiss it all as ill 
considered anarchism, naiive utopianism or a romantic 
Fabian variant of corporatism. That is far from the case.
The contradictions are in large part very real ones which 
confront any attempt to evolve a transition to socialism in 
which politics is in command, the production relations are 
transformed and the level of productive forces simultaneously 
developed and restructured. What is unhelpful is the 
'production socialist' tendency to put down both the thesis 
and the antithesis as goals as if that somehow constituted 
a synthesis - a route much more in the 'functionalist',
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'end of ideology' North American political 'science' tradition 
than in the Marxian one of dialectical struggle.
Tanzania does need more directly productive fixed investment 
and more public sector investible surplus. To isolate this 
from infrastructural fixed investment, education and public 
services and especially from public enterprise working 
capital finance (virtually never seen as investment by the 
Tanzanian 'production socialists') is counterproductive. For 
example in cashew nut growing wells, roads, houses, seedlings, 
agricultural input and crop finance, health facilities, 
adult education including agricultural education and marketing/ 
processing/transporting institutions are all infinitely more 
critical than plant and machinery (tractors? mechanized 
implements? specialized silos?) for cashew producers 
(communal or individual). Cashew nuts may be an extreme 
case but on balance Tanzania has been too concerned with 
plant and machinery in isolation from other production 
package elements, not the reverse.
Similarly, Tanzania does need greater mass participation in 
decision taking and decision frame setting if it is to 
achieve the type of transition to socialism (and the type 
of socialism) TANU's leadership has sought. However, both 
Chinese experience and that of TANU suggest that participation 
goes together with a basic human need - not a maximum fixed 
investment and Cross Domestic Product growth oriented - strategy. 
Tanzania may have placed somewhat too low an emphasis on growth, 
which is a precondition for being able to move ahead with 
any strategy, but the position of the 'production socialists'
(and indeed at a different level of the USSR) as the last 
of the 1960's self confident 'growthmen' fits oddly with 
their other emphasis on simple technology, small units and 
participation. And on participation there seems to be a 
clear assumption that unless workers and peasants decided 
they wanted the same things as the writer then there was no 
'true' participation, only 'false consciousness'. Either 
that is a definitional tautology or it is arrogant, intellectual 
elitism owing more to Plato's Republic than to any of Marx's 
writings.
39. Some of the 'production socialist' work explicitly, and more 
implicitly, relates to the 1920s and 1930s Soviet debate on, and 
resulting policies toward, agriculture. However, it is hard to 
avoid the conclusion that the use of elements from diverse 
positions and periods results in a pastiche not a synthesis. 
Further, the Soviet experience suggests that viewing agriculture 
as a sector to be exploited for surplus to build up the state, 
the cities and heavy industry has quite specific costs and builds 
in long term contradictions inimical to at least the production 
relations and mobilization aspects of transition to socialism.
In this context the Chinese model - very different from the 
Soviet especially in its higher emphasis on agriculture as a 
sector and peasants as immediate beneficiaries of higher 
productive forces - would appear both more relevant to Tanzania 
and more consistent with the main trends in non-bureaucratic and 
on-technocratic Marxian analysis. The attempt in some production 
ocialist writing to blend Stalin and Mao on agriculture appears 
to misunderstand both.
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The contradictions are real - as a Tanzanian minister warned 
building socialism is not like a social dance - but the 
'production socialists' critique of the TANU strategy while 
often valid, insightful and telling at the micro level becomes 
self defeating when added together and ultimately fails to 
provide a coherent macro alternative.^0
The failure of the 'production socialists' to be heard 
consistently turns on their own objective contradictions 
about participation and about worker and peasant supremacy 
in decision taking. In 1969 several were welcomed as 
independent technical experts in Plan working groups. Problems 
arose when they claimed a (mystical?) oneness with the 'masses' 
allowing rejection of TANU positions which, whatever else 
could be said of them, had at least been discussed, and 
sometimes proposed by rather large numbers of workers and 
peasants. Similarly, the greater analytical power of their 
critical than their positive proposal work leads to stunning 
anomalies. For example, in West Lake 'production socialist' 
analysis (partly within the Regional Planning exercise) 
pinpointed a number of serious defects in the conceptual­
ization, articulation and operation of villaaeization even 
if its tone was often somewhat overemphatic and its quantitative 
descriptions appeared exaggerated. Equally it clearly showed 
the limits to what could be achieved even if villages did 
move to true Ujaama status. However, the counterproposals 
centered on small local capitalists, 'progressive farmers' 
and the Bukoba Cooperative Federation. Since these were 
historically and objectively the bodies most opposed to 
socialism and least controlled by peasants or workers, it is 
hardly surprising that the proposals were not sinoly rejected 
but put the good faith of their authors and the validity of 
their criticisms at issue.
40. At the international economic system level the same result 
emerges by different routes. The capitalist (and to a lesser 
degree the European socialist) systems are analyzed as inherently 
exploitative in relations with non-industrial countries (a valid 
contention). A number of individual Tanzanian external transaction: 
are criticized (often, though not always, correctly) as having 
been bad deals and/or increased dependence. Alternatively all 
efforts to negotiate with capitalist states and all efforts to 
create a semi-independent Third World bargaining force or 
economic system are seen not simply as of limited potential but 
as objectively reactionary mystification. The conclusion is 
reached (conceivably quite correctly) that international economic 
reform requires a socialist world order of relatively equally 
strong socialist states. What TANU’s leadership or government 
ministers or officials or managers do in the meantime can only 
chip at the edges of the problem at best and will probably make 
it worse. This may well be true in an eschatalogical sense but 
offers no answer to the question 'What is to be done?' and is 
counterproductive unless one assumes that the socialist order 
can come only from revolution in the industrial centres and 
that Tanzania's efforts are either premature or irrelevant 
both globally and for Tanzanians.
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It is not surprising that at best the critics are seen by 
many TANU members and leaders as an ivory tower elite abstracted 
from real involvement with workers and peasants or as 'infantile 
leftists' and at worst as authoritarians whose commitment is 
to power and prestige not people or participation.
This is not a healthy situation - the 'production socialists' 
are asking several of the right questions whatever one thinks 
of the answers. Bundling the criticisms out with the odder 
action and the analysis out with the analysts' assertion of 
his right to decide himself what the masses 'really' think 
is counter-productive. It does limit inquiry and provides a 
defence for existing authoritarian, technocratic and secretive 
tendencies. It also reinforces the critics' perception of 
themselves as prophets and of politicians, managers and 
officials as a closed elite whose rejection of their proposals 
and claims for power to implement them represents a sub-class 
interest and little else.
Who Got What They Wanted?
The short answer to the question is probably nobody in Tanzania 
in full but quite a number of involved institutions in part. 
Kilimo got a large public sector baking capacity, but at a 
time when the adulteration/short weighting issue had either 
been resolved or lost to sight. NMC got a large, headache 
ridden project it had not wanted, but moved it into an 
operating and price position which at least avoided threatening 
the corporation's ability to supply products and to remain 
financially viable. The Treasury agreed to a project on ill 
defined socio-economic gains grounds (which then fell from 
sight), but did use low cost funds and stands to make a 
surplus for other uses on the relending transaction. The 
private bakers are constrained by a major public sector 
capability but remain in business. The bread consumers of 
Dar es Salaam have had an extra increase in their bread price 
compared to what the old bakeries needed, but have avoided 
the critical bread would have resulted
41. The 1976 overcapacity resulted from the Automatic Bakery's 
creation. Without it the sector would have been at or near 
capacity. The 1974-76 economic crisis (not foreseeable in 
1968 or 1972) would have delayed the capacity constraint to 
say 1978 but not resolved it.
IX.
had NMC not built
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On the Canadian side the consultants and machinery producers 
probably did get what they wanted - relatively generous 
contracts for goods and services. Canadian Aid, however, 
while it did get a loan agreement to reduce the backlog of 
unallocated funds then piling up, did not get rapid disbursement 
and did get a project subject to both Tanzanian and Canadian 
criticisms.
The results look more like a mildly unsatisfactory compromise 
than either a clever scheme to influence political decision 
taking, a cogent identification of and action to meet a 
compelling social priority, a production and investible 
surplus example to be copied or a major technical and 
financial debacle. Many decisions and projects were vastly 
better and a number e.g. Kariakoo Market, COSATA, the new 
Uvinza Salt "Works', TANCUT (diamond cutting), the McKinsey 
model STC reorganization, probably all the pre 1974 cashew 
nut processing ventures, MECCO (construction), NEDCO (design) 
probably Dar Motor Transport and National Road Haulage and 
National Cold Chain have been very significantly worse.
Bread was kept available to Dar workers (with minor breaks 
relating to grain supply not baking capacity) at price 
levels not significantly above what any capacity expansion 
would have entailed. The building of the decentralized 
parastatals was not seriously hampered since DDC had quite 
enough projects as did worker cooperatives. No really 
serious financial or managerial burdens were placed on NMC or 
the Treasury (or for that matter Kilimo) prejudicing their 
other activities. No Tanzanian improperly amassed wealth 
or power (nor even unbearable headaches) and the degree of 
Tanzanian external dependence was in no serious way increased 
(nor improved).
To assert the contrary is as unrealistic as to claim more. 
Equally to claim that the Dar bread decision - taken by itself - 
could have yielded major gains on any of these fronts is not 
very plausible. What is realistic is to suggest that the 
decision preparation and decision taking process was weaker 
than should have been the case and that these weaknesses 
cumulated across a series of decisions have entailed costs of 
inefficiency in respect to each goal sought, whether better 
bread, more investible surplus or lower import reliance.
42. CIDA might be said to be especially unlucky. It did provide 
what Tanzania sought. And when (conceivably partly in response 
to the bakery problems) it took the opposite approach of 
repeated restudies of alternative technolocries on the Dar water 
supply project it received much sharper Tanzanian criticism 
because the studying delayed the project so long that it 
could not be completed before Dar had hit the ceiling of 
existing capacity and experienced acute water shortages for 
two years and until costs had esculated 100% against those 
at the time discussions were begun more than offsetting the 
(not unreal) savings from redesign.
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The most cogent micro case against the bakery is that Sh 8 
million of domestic resources were used for it instead of 
for a higher priority use; e.g. small scale agricultural 
processing plants. This conclusion depends on the assumptions 
that the private bakeries could and would have continued 
their 1968-72 expansion, that baking was not a priority 
area for public ownership,43 and that quality and weight 
control could have been enforced or were not worth the cost 
of reallocating scarce domestic investment to the bakery.
It was de facto the case NMC and Treasury argued but which 
was not-acceptable to the Minister for Agriculture because 
he rejected the last two assumptions.
X.
Reflections
The automatic bakery project is of general interest as a 
study in problems in the decision taking process in Tanzania 
with special reference to 1968-72 and to a lesser degree 
1972-76. Many of the issues involved are still real. A 
study of what was decided, with what information and what 
analysis, and why can be useful in seeing how to improve 
future decision making. To do that the study must be 
accurate - e.g. to treat NMC as initiating or even wanting 
the bakery and to substitute surplus generation for product 
control as the dominant goal hopelessly muddles the exercise. 
Equally an exercise of this kind must be quite different
43. To argue a la Coulson that the private bakery expansion 
was 'at no cost to the government1 is hopelessly inadequate.
It is a startling contention from a 'production socialist' 
since, in that bold and unqualified form, it is an ideological 
mainstay of lalssez faire capitalism. In the first place to 
use cost and investment as synonymous is misleading - any 
investment has a cost in that sense e.g. the nationalization 
of the main wheat, maize and rice mills 'cost' on the order 
of Sh 30 million but soon yielded annual post-tax surplus flows 
well over a quarter of that investment. In the second place 
random encouragement of private enterprise expansion - even 
if it is available and willing - is an odd way to achieve a 
transition to socialism. To be cogent the argument must 
give priority schedules for public sector takeover and 
argue that for some years a particular existing activity and 
its expansion should be left in private hands because it is 
already subject to public sector control (bread quality and 
weight was clearly not) particularly unsuited to public 
sector operation given existing and short term, future sectoral 
apabilities (true for small bakeries but less so for the 
automated one) and/or highly peripheral (a highly debateable 
int for a staple foodstuff consumed by a high proportion 
metropolitan workers).
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from a campaign of blame casting (or avoiding) if it is to 
be useful.44
The automatic bakery decision given the knowledge available 
and the alternatives actually open was not a very bad one, 
neither was it very satisfactory in terms of Tanzanian 
targets for quality standards in such decisions. Because 
it was a moderate size decision which involved more than 
usual documentation and controversy it is both typical of a 
number of decisions in terms of size and complexity and 
atypical in terms of ease of study.4'’ Less than strategic 
but much more than routine decisions like that in respect 
of the bakery arise perhaps a score of times a year. They 
pose special problems because the full panoply of personnel, 
analysis and political decision taking attention given to 
strategic decisions cannot be mobilized for them while the 
helpful guidelines of directly relevant experience which 
backstop and facilitate the routine decisions are equally 
unavailable. Examination of the problems surrounding such 
decisions probably deserves more attention than it has 
received in Tanzania not simply because, as the President 
has repeatedly pointed out, 'mistakes are mistakes' but 
because only by examining past partial mistakes and partial 
successes in decision preparation and taking can only under­
stand the underlying causes of the strengths and weaknesses 
of the process in order to build up a capacity for more 
nearly correct future decision preparation and taking.
Only then will one be able to 'Choose to go forward' rather 
than repeating the past.
44. It should be made clear that the author does not claim 
he raised the issues he now poses over 1968-72. His views 
then were in the main not significantly divergent from the 
corporate position of the Treasury. Its limitations were his 
as well and the criticisms which can be made of it can be 
applied to him.
45. To date such study has been limited because while little
of the data is - or is seen by the government as - confidential 
a great deal is in places where its retrieval is hampered by 
the confidentiality of associated papers and by the problems 
of conducting a wholesale search through Tanzania's none too 
well indexed or organized files. Further much that is not - 
or no longer - confidential is recorded only in illegible 
minutes or fading memories. One use of this paper is intended 
to be to bring as much as possible of the data into one 
publicly available place.
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The learning contributions of the Automatic Bakery project 
fall into two categories - proposals and remedies often 
propounded which would not have led to a significantly 
better decision preparing and taking process and guidelines 
for decision process strengthening. The first are not 
unimportant because they are seen as negative. While their 
irrelevance to this case does net mean they are always useless, 
it does suggest their importance may be overrated and that 
major efforts to use them may represent a misallocation of 
resources. They include:
a. Better Project Evaluation Techniques. No known 
technique would have helped significantly in this case. The 
basic P/E (price earings ratio) work was adequate. P/E
(or Discounted Cash Flow) is too economistic (at least as 
PE or DCF are normally used) to have answered the genuine 
questions on socio-economic aims, private versus public 
sector and acceptable public sector institutions. A better 
project on capitalist micro criteria would not necessarily 
contribute to greater macro efficiency within a strategy 
of transition to socialism.
b. Admonitions to Consider Non-Economic Factors or 
alternatively to Avoid Political Interference. The key 
factor in the project's initiation and acceptance was 'non­
economic' ; the problem was that it remained quantitatively 
vague and qualitatively uncertain. The alternative admonition 
is either grossly ideological (and the wrong ideology for 
Tanzania) or silly. It is a proper concern of a politician 
that unadulterated bread of the correct weight be available 
and, more generally, to try to take the political out of 
political economy is either a purely academic exercise or a 
defense of some special interest (usually, but not necessarily, 
a capitalist one). Taken literally it says 'keep politics
out of political decisions' which is rather like seeking 
dehydrated water.
c. Sophisticated Social Cost/Benefit Analysis. To have 
arrived at a guess as to the 'money cost equivalent' of 
loss of nutrition, illness, discontent from bad or skimpy 
loaves and treated that as part of the social profit of the 
project would not have been helpful. It would not have 
been 'scientific' because the 'precise' figure would have 
been the direct result of some technician's very imprecise 
value judgement and would probably have substituted not 
simply for a political judgement by properly constituted 
decision takers but also for actually trying to measure the 
size and severity of the socio economic problem.
Productive Sector Priority. A bakery is per se a 
directly productive sector project. However, this one was 
decided upon despite a low probable rate of surplus generation 
because of socio-economic reasons analagous to those governing 
rural water decisions. Nor does a general guideline that 
productive sector projects as a group must generate a target 
rate or level of investible surplus help much in deciding 
whether a given case is a valid exception if strong social
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and/or political reasons for treating it as such have been 
presented.
The positive guidelines can be grouped in eight clusters 
some relating to project consideration, some to financing, 
others to sectoral and macro judgements and a last to follow- 
up and evaluation. The division is not on a standard micro 
(economic) versus macro (political) basis - the argument 
from the bakery case is for integration of political economic 
and socio-economic considerations throughout the decision 
preparing and taking process.
1. Project Consideration - Internal Factors
a. The importance of the project in terms of its product,
users, linkages and other characteristics should be 
spelled out and related to strategic goals (e.g. bread 
for urban worker consumption is a basic food).
b. All goals for the project (pure food, surplus, etc.)
should be specified and prioretized.
c. The goals should be quantified (e.g. how much adulter­
ation and shortweighting exist) and this should be done 
in terms of outputs not costs (e.g. in the control by 
inspection option reduction of abuses must be estimated 
not simply cost of inspectors).
d. Particularly in regard to 'non-economic1 goals participatory 
structures should be used to determine how significant
the goal (or the problem to be eliminated) is as 
perceived by workers and peasants. (e.g. Dar es Salaam's 
TANU cells and branches could give a better idea on the 
bread quality/weight issue than any technician or even 
political leader. Some of them raised the issue but it 
was never put to them for systematic discussion.)
e. Serious efforts should be made to check cost data, 
build in allowances for esculation (or to achieving 
contract clauses blocking or limiting it if possible) 
and test project performance for different cost and 
output assumptions - i.e. use 'crude' sensitivity 
analysis.
f. Possible project operators should be identified (and 
compared) in terms of ability to achieve project goals 
and the benefit (or the reverse) of the project to 
building up the operating institution's overall capabilities.
Project Consideration - Spread Effects
The effect of the project on demand for scarce resources 
(e.g. foreign exchange for wheat) and on stimulating 
demand for local production (e.g. local wheat or - 
given a mixed flour - sorghum and millet) should be 
quantified.
A foreign exchange projection for the project covering 
its construction and operation stages should be drawn 
up (with clear specifications as to what the alternative 
assumed is e.g. less bread? private bakeries?).
Alternative Approach Consideration
The first step is to consider whether any project is 
needed to achieve goals (e.g. why not control private 
bakeries and let them expand).
The second is to identify alternative technical approaches 
-e.g. mechanical bakeries, brick ovens, and/or alternative 
institutions to operate them (e.g. the then Dar Development 
Corporation, baker Co-operatives).
The options (of no project or a sharply restructured 
one) can then be evaluated in terms of the goals to 
achieve which the project was proposed.
Financing and Negotiating
All financing options should be evaluated in terms of 
true financial cost to Tanzania with long payment and 
low interest to Tanzania as gains and higher costs 
(e.g. tied aid) or delays in approval (e.g. IEP.D 
procedures) as costs.
The same costing should be done from the project operator's 
point of view.
If there is a divergence between the lowest cost to 
Tanzania and to the project operator, the former should 
prevail. However, a tentative case then exists for the 
Treasury to offset the extra cost to the user,(e.g. 
by a soft loan or an adjustment of the principal sum),
Whether the tentative case should prevail, be modified 
or be rejected depends on whether the operator needs the 
offset to have an acceptable project financial result 
and on who will pay the cost if there is no offset 
(e.g. in the case of bread the offset would benefit 
primarily wage earners whereas in the case of a detergent 
factory it would benefit primarily salary earners).
Attempts should be made to secure offers from, and 
negotiate terns with, more than one potential 
supplier before tieing the project to a credit source 
which is useable only in one country. Efforts should 
also be made to secure finance from sources which can be 
used to buy from the supplier offering the best contract.
Technology/Knowledge
Capacity to identify hard (e.g. machinery) and soft 
(e.g. operating procedure and institution) technology 
should be built up and involved in consiseration of 
all significant projects (Indcentre in the bakery case 
was only peripherally involved and did not consider 
the soft technology side);
The capacity should be directed to achieving unpackaging 
(e.g. local building design and erection, purchase of 
machinery from several sources with Tanzanian super­
vision of installation).
It should also build up guidelines and access to data 
for evaluating prices (including probable future 
servicing and spares costs).
This information should be used directly in negotiation 
by involving the technology consultancy unit (whether 
Indcentre, TIB, Institute of Finance Management,
National Institute of Productivity or Tanzania Industrial 
Consultancy Organisation) in the negotiating team 
along with the project operator, legal, planning and 
general business economic personnel.
Constraints From Weaknesses In Related Sectors
Consultancy especially in respect of 'soft' (organizational) 
issues and of building design.
Architectural design.
Construction.
In each case there are weaknesses in overall Tanzanian 
(or even Tanzania located foreign firm) capacity and in 
the second and third the public sector is weak within 
the total of Tanzanian based capacity. The three 
weaknesses interact to 'produce' unsuitable structures, 
unnecessarily high design and erection costs, delays 
in construction, needlessly high imports of services 
and building materials, and operational/institutional 
patterns inappropriate to Tanzania.
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7. Project/Macro Planning/Strategy Interlock
a. The linkage of project goals to those of the annual 
planning exercise as a whole and to the broad strategy 
(for the sector and more broadly) should be made clear 
at the start of project consideration and checked again 
in final presentations for decision.
b. The relative importance of the project (and/or an 
alternative form of it) to the national planning 
exercise and strategy should be made clear.
c. When possible the opportunity cost of the project -
usually in the simple terms of the avilable substitute 
in the same or a related sector (e.g. small scale 
tinning plants for the Automatic Pakery) - should be 
identified so decision takers have a clear idea of what 
is being 'sacrificed', 'traded off1, left out for the 
project under consideration to go ahead.
8. Followup and Evaluation
a. When the consideration of a project leads to ident­
ification of removeable constraints in related sectors 
(e.g. small scale parastatal managerial and operational 
competence, design sector private cartel and public 
unit weakness, construction capacity limits and doubtful 
competence or cost efficiency especially in the public 
sector) some mechanism (channel of communication) 
should exist to feed that information into planning
for those sectors. Generally the effects will be on 
future projects not the one under consideration. But 
unless the project in hand's experience triggers 
action, the same constraints will presently face 
future projects.
b. Equally when limitations on the decision preparation 
and taking process are noted that information should 
also be fed into an ongoing review process.46
c. Each project should be evaluated at commissioning and
after (say) 1,3,5 and 7 years of operation against
projections and goals set at the time of decision (e.g.
what has happened on adulteration and short-weighting 
and why?).
46. To be blunt - Devplan, the Economic Advisor to the 
Treasury or a member of Kilimo's planning unit should have 
attempted a paper along the present lines in 1972. This 
again is hindsight - the author did think of this point 
while still EA/T but not in 1972. Even in 1973/74 he 
did not give this particular exercise high enough priority 
to get it done.
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d. Radical divergences in costs, outputs and goal fulfilment 
(whether positive or negative) should be analyzed as to 
cause and as to how to promote (positive) or limit 
(negative) them in future.
e. These evaluations should be a formal part of the annual 
planning (and especially the annual parastatal planning) 
process. They should be available to decision takers in 
Party and government and should also be published in a 
form comprehensible to the lay reader. In particular 
they should be prepared in consultation with and released 
to Workers Councils and Party Branch committees.
Viewed more broadly the Automatic Bakery affords some insights 
into the problems of the Tanzanian decision making process 
paradigm.'s realization in actual operation. The paradigm 
can be set out as:
1. Proposals related to ways of advancing toward systemic 
goals which can be either large or^small and can properly 
originate with anyone;
2. Testing of the proposals against the needs of workers and 
peasants through the political process in a way in 
which real worker and peasant statement and consciousness 
of their needs is maximized; leading to
3. Political decision in principle as to what is to be done 
and why in fairly general terms; requiring
4. Formulation both by direct worker and peasant inputs and 
by 'clever people' of the means - with associated costs 
and probable results - of carrying out the decision
(not necessarily by the means initially suggested); 
flowing back to a
5. Final political decision to act taken by the Party (at 
a level in principle related to the scope, importance 
and urgency of the division) and articulated by the 
Government (and/or a governmental or paragovernmental 
instrumentality); leading to
6. Implementation by governmental, paragovernmental, worker 
and peasant bodies and individuals, ideally in a creative 
rather than a routinized way; followed and informed by
7. Review on the basis of worker and peasant, party and 
technical evaluation of the results; to guide
Revision and tocrectLnc new insights for subsequent 
decisions.
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The process is both in principle and in practice intensely 
political - technocrats and intellectuals, as such, are 
very rarely in command. It is in principle, but rather 
unevenly in practice, highly participatory. The contradictions 
here are between the process and the goals it is intended to 
serve (e.g. a regional decision to opt for a capitalist road 
must be overridden at the centre no matter how participatory 
it was on its face) and between acting on worker and peasant 
perceptions and the raising of worker and peasant levels of 
consciousness (the reason behind President Nyerere's title 
of Mwalimu but equally behind his belief that compulsion is 
at times integral to defending or advancing participation) .
There are at least five tendencies for the process to go 
astray:
a. technocratic judgements not based on the same value 
foundations as those of the decision takers' can 
drastically alter the real content of a decision in 
'formulation' e.g. the astounding transformation the 
World Bank guided 1964 Farm Settlement Programme 
represents in respect to President Nyerere's 1962 
speech from which, in principle, it sprang;
b. state bureaucratic (government including the national 
and subordinate assemblies, Councils, Committees and 
parastatals) implementation is frequently both 
hierarchical and formalistic and at times thus not 
only creates 'abuses' but radically alters the meaning 
of what is done through alteration of style e.g. the 
worst of the 1974 villageization operations;
c. Party bureaucratic which appears at some levels and 
in some cases either to substitute itself for or to 
manipulate worker and peasant perceptions e.g. several 
of the 1973-74 decisions on the pace of villageization 
and on revival of agricultural by-laws which were 
initially opposed by the centre and (for different 
reasons) local government bureaucrats and which while 
apparently produced by Party meetings do not in retrospect 
appear to have embodied actual peasant consciousness
so much as Party bureacracy irritation at the slowness 
of change;
d. political decision taker lack of adequate perception of 
the limits of the possible imposed either by levels 
and form of productive forces (e.g. the repetitive 
abortive attempts to create rural cooperative shops by 
first closing private ones) or by the level and nature 
of consciousness (e.g. the recurrent dress code fiascos).
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This is not to arque the paradigm is unreal nor that most 
decisions are bad. That would be manifestly untrue. The 
archtypal pattern cases of the full use of the process are 
probably the capital shift to Dodoma and the total recasting 
of the Marriage Act. The Automatic Bakery provides a quite 
different type of test because it was a decision of a class 
neither large enough nor infrequent enough to justify the 
full panoply of a special national consultative process.
1. Proposals came from workers 'end adulterated and short-
weighted bread'. They came into the Party or govern­
mental system (Ndugu Bryceson either in his Party or MP 
role not as Minister); and did lead to
2. Testing with some workers and with technical personnel 
to demonstrate that there was a problem albeit the 
testing via the Party political process seems to have 
been rather informal and random; but a
3. political decision in principle was taken which had at 
least de facto Party and Cabinet backing; from which 
flowed;
4. Formulation notably lacking any direct worker and
peasant input and marked by substantial technical
personnel doubts as to the true costs and results of the 
menas initially proposed without the emergence of any 
viable alternative;after which;
5. a final political decision to act (on a scaled down 
basis) was taken; and
48. The hand bakery/cooperative production complemented 
by public sector procurement/marketing support could only 
have emerged as a serious contender in the context of 
detailed discussion with Dar es Salaam Ward and Cell Party 
leaders who might have been able to show that expertise and 
core groups of potential bakers did exist. While the Automatic 
Bakery case is not one in which it is probable that neigh­
borhood input would have been such as to alter the decision 
articulation process, in other cases - e.g. co-operative 
shops, urban markets - it almost certainly would have had 
that result with both economistic and social gains. The 
absence or weakness of participation at this stage is 
illustrated by the Automatic Bakery case whether or not in 
this particular case it affected the actual outcome.
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6. Implementation proceeded with reasonable although not 
outstanding efficiency as to controlling costs and 
realizing output goals but rather less in keeping the 
process on schedule, maximizing Tanzanian involvement 
or seeking to overcome the problems which had caused 
the approval of the Automatic Bakery in the absence of 
an effective decentralized (District) parastatal sector; 
and
7. Review beyond the most formal checking of prooress was 
episodic not only at technical but even more at 
political level with the exception of the somewhat 
special debate noted earlier which did not really 
relate directly either to the project or to the 
political decision making process; with the result that
8. Revision and New Insights either in respect of the 
Automatic Bakery itself or of the type of decision of 
which it is a representative have not been particularly 
numerous or significant.
These 'lessons' do not demonstrate, nor seek to demonstrate, 
whether the Automatic Bakery decision was the best available 
one at the relevant time and under the actual knowledge, 
personnel, institutional and financial constraints then 
prevailing. They seek to draw upon the experience of that 
decision preparation and taking process so as to strengthen 
the process for future decisions. Learning by doing requires 
more than doing again and again. It requires analyzing what 
has been done and what has happened in order to see how it 
can be done better on the next occasion.
